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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

MILITARY PROCUREMENT
AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Pursuant to the previous order. the Chair lays
before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk '\\ill state.
The a. sistnnt legislative clerk read as
follows:
A bill tH.R 8G87) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels,
tracked combat vehicle~. torpedoes. and
other weapons. and resee.rch, development,
test. and evaluation for the Armed Forces,
and to prescribe the authorized personnel
strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and
for other purposes.

The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under
the previous order, the Senator from
Montana is recognized for 15 minutes.
AMENDMENT NO. 437

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in
the past seYeral months I have received
at lea:;t 10,000 cards that all read as
follow~:
JULY 31, 1971.
To you. Sir, and your Party Members:
Do vou realize that 1t has been over seven
years· since the first U.S. servicemen was
taken prbioner In Southeast Asia? It Is the
responsibility of the elected officials of this
country to take all possible actions to bring
about treatment of these men as required
by the Geneva Cmwentlon of 1949.
Further. It Is the responslbUity of our
elected officials to bring about a release uf
all prisoners of war.
What ha,·e you done?

Mr. President, in an effort to seek out
and bring back Americans held captive
or missing in Indochina, the issue of
Vietnam will be raised again, and, may I
say, if necessary, again and again this
year. It will be raised in the form of an
amendment to the pending measure. The
Senate will be asked once again to join
in seeking a conclusion to this tragedy

that continues to wrack and split the
Nation. It .. hould not take long to consider the ;tmendment because it expresses an action which the Senate has
taken alrea.Jy. In every respect, save one,
the amendment is identical to the Vietnam withdrawal amendment adopted decisively just 3 month~ ago.
The amendment calls for a total withdrawal fr01 1 Indochina within 6 months
on conditi<•n only that our Americans
held captive or located among the missing-in-action be released. The change is
solely an adjustment in time from the 9month span of the previous amendment
to allow for the lapse of 3 months.
In simp:e terms, this amendment
would fuse the cooperation of the Congress-the legislative branch of our
GovernmeLlr-to the President's direction of policy in order to bolster tllis
Nation's ol iective of withdrawal from
Indochina. It would assure withdrawal
on a single rondition-that the President
reach an a reement whereby our prisoners of wnr and those missing in action
who can I e located-the POW's and
MIA's-be returned home. The time
frame, I rc•>eat, is 6 months, 6 months
from the d;tt.e of enactment of this bill.
It is my hope that this effort w1ll be
accepted in t.he spirit in which it is made.
Within the context of the independent
responsibili ies of t.he Senate, it is an effort to coo•>ernte with the President in
bringing about an end, once and for all,
to this trag c mistake.
There an• good rea;;ons for joining the
Congress and the Pre.ident in a national
policy of full withdrawal from Vietnam.
The repeal of the Tonkm Gulf resolution, for in,tance, struck down last year
what many believe was the sole legal
foundation for involvement. There is,
moreover, the upcoming election in South
VIetnam. the circumstances of which
have led others to note the increasing
urgency of our withdrawal. Insofar as I
am concerned, the most over-riding
reason has been and remains the utter
waste of this involvement. It is the waste
of lives, the waste of tens of billions of
dollars as the needs of cities and towns
and other urgencies within the Nation
are compelled to stand aside. It is the
waste of spirit as the Nation remains torn
by the divhiveness of the war.
So there sample cause to get out. That
is what the amendment proposes, a final
getting-out of Vietnam with 6 months,
tied only to the complete release of the
POW 's and recoverable MIA's. It proposes, in a sentence, a decisive end to
this tragic chapter in the Nation's history.
In meetill"' that obJe<;tive it should be
said that tl.e amendment works hand in
hand \\ith the tripod approach which
has been set down by the President by
protecting the three parties most af·
fected. The assurances are there for all:
assurances to the South Vietnamese people themsehes that they be given a reasonable chance to survive freely and elect
their own government; assurances to the
POW's and surviving MIA's that they be
guaranteed safe passage home; assurances to young Americans-draftees in
large part-who are still being compelled
to lay down their lives in Southeast Asia,
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that there will be a quick end to the
killing.
That is the thteefold objective of the
amendment and it fits with the tripod of
the President's approach. It should be
noted in this connection that next Sunday the South Vietnamese go to the polls
in an election which, with justification,
has come undl'r a cloud. Such as it is,
nevertheless, it is an election and It
forms the first leg of the tripod of the
President.'s approach which is to give the
people a chance to choose a government.
In going to the polls next Sunday,
moreover, the people of South Vietnam
do so under an armed-forces umbrella of
more than a million South Vietnamese.
For the last 17 years, they have been
advised, trained and supported by the
United States. They stand as one of the
world's largest military establish 1ents.
There is, thus, no question that the ••uth
Vietnamese have that reasonable r -~~nee
to survive freely. That is the seco!l· leg
of the tripod which the President h,, ,•cet
up as a basis for U.S. withdrawal.
The third Is based on the POW's and
MIA's who, to me, represent the most
tragic aspect of this entire issue. Insofar
as I am personally concerned, the fate of
these men, at this late date, Is the only
significant basis for this Nation to remain any longer In Vietnam. To the
POW's and MIA's, this amendment offers
not an expressed intention or a helicopter in the sky but a sober assurance of
action on their release and recovery. It is
the assurance that inside of 6 months
after a ceasefire. concrete steps will be
taken to locate them and to secure their
rclease. No more pressing issue exists at
this late date in the war than that of
seeking out and bringing back the men
held captive or the recoverable MIA's Indeed, it must be faced in all candor that
the prospects are dim for the return of
any of these men unless and until we decide that for this Nation the war in Vietnam is completely over and act accordingly. It is unfair and irresponsible to
stimulate the hopes of those men and
their families with promises of action
where action is not feasible. Unless and
until this Nation moves in the direction
set forth in the amendment, either by
Presidential directive or law, I repeat,
it is highly doubtful that the POW's or
the MIA's will return to this Nation. That
is the true warranty of the amendment.
It is a sober assurance of the release,
forthwith, of the POW's and MIA's who
survive.
The purpose of the amendment is clear.
Except as indicated, its content is unchanged from what the Senate, by vote
of 61 to 38, has already adopted. U the
Senate votes to restate its position and
the House now concurs, it would represent, I think, a constructive action by the
legislative branch of Government which
complements the administration's policy
to the end that the tragedy in Vietnam
will be concluded at last.
I send the amendment to the desk, Mr.
President, and ask unanimous consent
that it be pt;ntcd in the RECORD at this
point.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
amendment will be received and printed,
and will lie on the table; and, without
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objection, the amendment will be printed
in the RECORD.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of the bill add a new title as
follows:
TITLE VI-TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA
SEc. 601. (a) It Is hereby declared to be the
policy of the United States to terminate at
the earliest practicable date all mll!tary operations of the United States In Indochina,
and to provide for the prompt and order!'
withdrawal of all United States mll!tary
f<>rces not later than six months after the
date of enactment of this section subject to
the release of all American prisoners of wa.r
held by the Government of North Vietnam
and forces allied with such Government. The
Congress hereby urges and requests the PresIdent to implement the above expressed policy by tnltlatlng lmmed!ately the following
actions:
.
(1) Esta.bllshlng a final date for the withdrawal from Indochina of all military forces
of the United States contingent upon the
release of e.ll American prisoners of war held
by the Government of North Vietnam and
forces silled wlth such Government, such
date to be not later than six months after
the date of enactment of thls Act.
(2) Negotiate with the GovenJmeut of
North VIetnam !or an Immediate cease-fire by
all parties to the hostUlt!es In Indochina.
(3) Nejl'Otlate with the Government of
North V1etna.m for an agreement which
would provide for a series of phased and
rapid withdrawals of United States mllltary forces !rom Indochina in exchange for
a corresponding series of phased releases of
American prisoners of war, and for the relea..<e of any reiJUl.luing American prisoners
of war oon.currently with the withdrawal o!
all remaining mllltary forces of the Un!too
States hy not latf>r than the date established
by the President pursuant to paragraph (1)
hereof or hy such earl!er date as may be
agreed upon hy the negotiating parties.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I had hoped
thlllt the majority leader woUld not find
it necessary to reintroduce this amendment at this time, but apparently progress in reaching the desired resUlts which
were incorporated in his earlier amendment or proposal has not been very satisfactory.
I want to say I have tried to support
the President down the line in his efforts,
his apparent efforts to bring the war in
Indochina to a close. I have felt that he
was going in the right direction. I still
feel he is going in the right direction and
give him e. high mark in the conduct of
foreign relations, but I am beginning to
be rather apprehensive that the desired
resUlts may not be attained.
I have felt, for myself, that next July 1
is the deadline for the time when our
military forces should be completely out
of Vietnam. I have made this clear not
only to people in our own Government,
but also to people in other governments,
including the South Vietnamese Government. I have come to the conclusion that
continued participation by our Armed
Forces beyond that date could be a liability rather than en aid to that Nation.
Now, the Senator from Montana has
reintroduced this amendment with the
6-month limitation of time after the bill
becomes enacted into law. Assuming t;p.at
may be in early December, it woUld still
give us until some time in the month
of June to complete this withdrawal.

I have felt deep concern, indeed, for
the families of the prisoners of war who
have been held over there, some of them
now for almost 7 years. It was over a year
ago I had a suggestion which had been
made to me which I passed on to the
Defense Department relative to an attempt to rescue some of these prisoners
by helicopter raid. I got a letter back
from the Department of Defense telling
me why it would not work, and then they
tried it and it did not work, so they were
absolutely right in their earlier judgment.
I am afraid that the war in Southeast
Asia will be written down as the most
disastrous chapter in American history.
There is no question about that. The
small country of Laos has been torn to
pieces. In Cambodia, 90 percent of the
economy has been destroyed, as far as
their export business goes, since Cambodia was invaded. South Vietnam itself is in terrific political turmoil, with
the outcome in doubt. And the United
States economy, thanks to the losses
we have sustained in this abortive effort in Southeast Asia, at a cost of over
$200 billion, is now in the most critical
situation it has been at least for the last
35 years. It is something that we shoUld
all worry about.
As I have said, I think next July 1st is
about the limit for our participation, in
a military sense, in South Vietnam or in
Southeast Asia. I woUld still support
reconstruction in Indochina and would
hope to undo the damage which has
happened there insofar as our resources
will permit, but I do not know at this
time whether our resources will permit
steps in that direction.
International finance associations are
now meeting here in Washington, and I
do not know just what they will want.
I suppose they will want the United
States to participate as generously as
we have done in the past providing
amounts running into billions upon billions upon billions of dollars. I would like
us to participate witt. those who are trying to establish and maintain adequate
international flnancmg in this world, but
I have to say in all truth that I do not
know what we can do and I do not see
how we can contribute further to the
World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, the IDA, and the other organizations, until we kr.ow with certainty, or
almost with certainty-nothing is ever
quite certain-what we are going to do
from now on in Indochina.
So, while I had hoped that we would
have progressed far enough now-I notice we are still withdrawing a few troops
from that area; I do not expect we will
withdraw them in increasing numbers
until after the South Vietnamese election next week-I do think the President
has it in his power to straighten out this
matter. Approval of the Mansfield
amendment as reintroduced will certainly demonstrate not only to the executive branch of Government but to the
rest of the world the position that the
U.S. Senate holds in this matter. We
might, perhaps, have settled it in "Onnectlon with the draft bill. I do not feel
too badly that we d1d not. because we had
two or three dl1ferent subjects to deal
with in that bill.
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So. under the circumstances, I feel
that I will vote for the new amendment
offered by the Senator from Montana, in
the hope that it will contribute toward
an early and a aecent settlement of a
situation which we should never have
gotten into in the first place.
Mr. STENNIS and Mr. CooPER addressed
the Chair.
The PRESIDENT Pl'O tempore. The
Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, are we
under a limitation of time?
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. There
is no limitation.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I rise to
support the amendment !ntroduced by
the distinguished majority leader, MIKE
MANSFIELD the main provision of which
declares that it is the policy of the United
States to withdraw all its forces from
Vietnam by the spring of 1972 provided
that all U.S. prisoners of war are retw·ned by the North Vietnamese and its
allies.
I have joined with Senator MANSFIELD,
Senator AIKEN, Senator CHuRcH, and
other Senators, in previous efforts to prevent the expansion of the war by U.S.
forces in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand
and I am happy to join him in this effort
to bring U.S . participation in the war to
u close.
The Senate approved a similar amendment to the Draft Extension Act by ·a.
substantial majority, and by so voting
reflected, I believe, the majority will of
the people oi this country to withdraw
its forces from Vietnam and end its participation in the war in Southeast Asia.
I agree with the Senator from Montana
that with the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Government of the
United States has no constitutional authority to keep its forces in Indochina
or to engage in hostilities there except to
protect our troops from imminent danger
as they are withdrawn. In the absence of
any approval by the Congress through
constitutional processes, the President is
without authority except to withdraw and
to protect our forces against imminent
danger as they \vithdraw. In fact, he has
steadily withdrawn U.S. forces, keeping
every commitment and reversing past
policies, for which he deserves full credit
and support. More than half of the
535,000 ground troops in Vietnam when
he assumed office have been withdrawn.
But the pace of future withdrawal is said
to be linked to the ability of the Government of South Vietnam to take over the
continuation of the war.
South Vietnam has over 1 million
men under arms, and after over 30 years
of war and as the recipient of tens of billions of dollar of direct assistance ought
to be in a position to conduct its own
military effort without U.S. forces.
I do not believe there is any constitu~ional or practical reason why the United
States should any longer determine its
rate of withdrawal upon the strength or
weakness of any particular govcr unent
in South Vietnam or upon the outcome
of elections there. As a matter of logistics, the time provided by Senator MANS-

s 15112

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE

FIELD's amendment is ample, particularly
since o~er half of our forces have already
been withdrawn since President Nixon
assumed office almost 3 years ago.
I have always believed the final solution to the Indochina war should not
lun ge upon military force but through
negotiatiOns. by all the nations concerned. Expanded war, and the application of force-massive firepower and
bombin~. have not brought a peaceful
settlement. When U.S. forces are withdrawn the United States may have little
control over the nature of the settlement.
But our lessened influence in a settlement
does not preclude a stable, peaceful settlement-in fact, It may enhance it. For
I doubt that other countries, our adversaries in the war-North Vietnam,
China, and Russin, or our friends, the
United Kingdom and others, or the neutrals, or the U.N. will seriously -assist in
negotiations as long as the United States
maintains forces--even residual forces in
Vietnam.
This ts confirmed by the history of negotiations at Paris. In August, on my return !rom the SALT talks in Helsinki I
met with Ambassador Habib. now appointed as Ambassador to Koren and
then our chief negotiator in talks with
the North Vietnamese nnd Vietcong. He
confirmed, as the Senate well knows,
that t here has been no progress in Paris
and the war has continued. I believe
fnilure is due prima:illy to the lhtransigence of North Vietnam and the Vietcong and that an international settlement offers the best chance for a stable
peace for the entire area. The reconvenmg of a Geneva Conference consisting
of all the countries involved, or as Senator AIK N has wisely suggested an Asian
conference, or possibly the U.N., will provide the best means of achieving a political settlement when U.S. forces are withdrawn.
The interest of the United States is to
have a stable peace in Southeast Asia
and certainly it Is the desire of all people, and particularly the people of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam.
The United States made an error in
continumg Its presence in Vietnam after
it was clear it was not in our national interest or necessary for our security, but I
recogn17.e the difficulty in changing our
course, us President Nixon has done. But
through a series of legislative actions the
Congress, and particularly the Senate,
has moved to end our military involvement in Indochina, first to end the widespread bombing of the North, later by
amendments to contain the war to Vietnam, and not to enlarge the engagement
in h ost1lities by U .S. forces to Thailand,
Cambodia, and Laos.
It iS now the time to end U.S. military
involvement in Indochina completely.
Senator MANSFIELD's amendment is a fair
and propel way to express the support of
the Senate, the Congress, and the country
for Lhc complete withdrawal of U.S.
forces. It is the proper role of the Congress to declare such a fundamental polIcy. I would hope that the administration, wh1ch has reversed the policy of
past administrations would concede the
right of the Congress to carry out its

duties under the Constitution to affirm
a fundam ·ntal policy clearly desired by
a majorit~ of the people of this country.
The peop: • of this country want an end
to U.S. pr ticipation in the war in Indochina, an d the Con ~ ress should express
this natio 1al v.ill. :For these reasons the
Congress hould support the amendment
offered tc lay by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD.
Mr. STl·:NNIS. Mr. President, regarding U1e ~ mendment just filed by the
Senator f om Mont1 na, I shall be quite
brief, but shall undertake, along with
other Sen. tors, to di ~cuss it on its merits
more full~ later.
I want to start with two points here. I
e.ppreciatf' so very much the fine attitude of t1 e Senator from Montana, all
the way t nrough re·• arding this subject,
at every tt:m , down to now. Also, the second point is, in his r emarks on this subject about the war and the POW's, he
certainly tarted off with an expression
of in teres~ and sym1·a thy and desire for
the terrni: ation of \.his conflict as soon
as possibll'. consistent with our mission
and all ol the matters that go in connection W ! ·hour intf'rventlon there. Certainly we \\ ant the POW's to be released
not only : t th e earllest month possible,
but the en liest time possible, even at the
earliest ho•tr possible.
But, M1. President , I submit there is
much mo1c involved in this amendment
than just : ubject m atter itself, as offered
as a part of this bill. and I most respectfully submtt that as legislation on a bill
of this kind, or the draft bill, the subject ma.ttt r of the amendment has already had its day in court. There are
many otl cr far-reaching matters involved in ·.his bUl, and it is a bill that
must movt along; it must make its legislative tral'ks and move to its ultimate
end, because it is just obviously necessary to au thorize weaponry, and it cannot
be appropriated for until it is authorized.
Appropria • ion bills are hanging up, waiting for tht passage of this bill.
That Is not enough reason for keeping
the war going, Mr. President, or keeping
the POW s in prison, but it is merely a
legislative fact of life on the 27th of
Septembet 1971, whf'n we are faced with
all these 0 1her legisla tive problems In this
bill and bt yond th1s bill; and I shall urge
that upon the Senate for consideration
later with a detailed st atement of the
facts with which we ~re confronted.
The second point I wish to make is that
I believe--·md I have been rather close
to this subJect -that in the first place we
already h ave a legh lative expression on
this subject; even in a bill as controversial other \ ise as the draft bUl was, we
already h:-. ve that expression. But I believe it \\ ould be a far more effective
legislative expression and leg-islative determination if the substance of this
amendme' t could just travel on !t6 own,
and not a a part of another bill-especially a bi .l that mu.,t be enacted- dealing with c ther subjects.
I think •t is releva nt to this bill; I am
not argui. ~ that it is not. The b!ll has
money in it for use in connection with
this war. But I think it would be a far
better, me ·e effectiH' legislative expres-
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s!on; even If the President of the United
States should veto a resolution to this
effect by Congress, it would be clearer
and more positive, and would not be the
result of a compromise in conference, as
sometimes 1s necessary. If It were passed
purely on its merits as an Independent
resolution, I think It would go much
futher . I believe it would gain more support in Congress, frankly. and would be
more effective as a legislative determination of what should be done about this
war.
Frankly-and I say this with the utmost respect-we have two members of
that fine commtitec on the :fj.oor now who
have just spoken in favor of this proposal.
Mr. AIKEN. Three.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes, three . I think that
Congress and the people are entitled to
a resolution on this subject that has been
before the Committee on Foreig;: Relations of the two Houses, with the great
eminence of their members, and their
experience and background of knowledge of this subject matter, and their
activity in it-to have the Committee on
Foreign Relations pass on It directly and
come here wit h a report from their committee on this subject matter. It has been
fully debated, but we have not had the
benefit of a report yet.
The same would apply in the other
body, and I think there would then be a
far better chan ce to pnss it, !rankly, than
there would when piling it on the so·
called military bills.
I am not dodging the work nor dodging
the issue, but just talking common sense;
and frankly , I have not understood why
it does not go that route. I just do not
sec yet-and I have raised this point
more than once--why the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Umted States
Senate, where the debate is going on, on
this matter. has not taken up the matter in the form of a resolution, or in such
form as they see fit, and given us a definite, concrete recommendation here in
the form of some legislative proposal
backed up with their opinions and consideration, and the testimony and the
evidence. I just do not understand why
that does not happen. This is not said
critically of the committee, because obviously this is a problem of the Nation,
and members of that committee have
worked here on the flood. But as a Member of Congress and a Member of this
body, I have expressed, as I said last year,
a desire to h <tve that committee pass
on it, and the House Committee on For·
eign Affairs, if they sec fit.
So, Mr. President, at a later date I
shall seek the privilege of speaking further on this subject. The Senator from
Montana has spoken to me about n!Treeing to a time to vote on the amendment.
I certainly do not want to delay a vote.
I want those who want to speak to have
an opportunity to do so. We have to know
something about the prospects of attendance on certain days, and when I speak
agam on the bill, nnd I shall speak briefly, at that time I intend to say something
especially about a ,; reeing to a lim1tation
of time and a vote on all the amendments.
The committee will be ready, and, subject to information about attendance,
we are ready to make agreements.
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Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator
from Vermont.
Mr. AIKEN. I hope an early determination can be made on this amendment, because we not only have to deal
with the Asian Bank, the Inter-American Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, and so forth, but the committee
is now working on the foreign aid bill,
and we have got to know where we are
going and how long we are supposed to
be going in that direction before we can
really take these other matters up and
work on them intelligently,
Mr. STENNIS. I can make this suggestion to the Senator: the way to control that is to take jurisdiction of this
subject matter and hold hearings on the
resolution as introduced by the Senator
from Georgia, and then you can control when it comes up.
Mr. AIKEN. Well, if the Senator from
Mississippi, the chairman of our Armed
Services Committee, can only persuade
the House of Representatives to act favorably on the Mansfield amendment and
send it over here, I am sure the whole
matter would be settled without much, if
any, delay.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. We
will get to a vote on this matter, as far
as I am concerned. very soon, and I hope
it can be disposed of.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as
always. the distinguished Senator from
Vermont has hit the nail on the head.
In emphasizing the part which the House
of Representatives could, should, or
might play, he approaches the nub of
the situatiOn which confronts the Senate.
May I say that I appreciate the courtesy and consideration shown by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, the
chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services and the manager of the bill now
before us. May I say also that in my
opinion nothing is more important than
this amendment as far as the future of
this country is concerned. I cannot think
of the Senate voting on a more important is..~ue than the one which hopefully
will be before us in the next 2 or 3 days.
As the Senator from Mississippi has
ind1cated, I did discuss with him the possibility of a time limitation on the
amendment just offered, preferably tomorrow, Wednesday, or Thursday--even
Friday. The day makes no difference to
me. All I want is a vote, an expression of
the sentiment of the Senate. I think this
issue is so important that perhaps on
this occMion a great majority of the
Senators will be in attendance to face up
to it. one way or the other.
As I say, there is no issue of greater
importance. When we think of drug addiction in this country, what do we .hink
of? Vietnam? Turkey? Not much. It
comes from the golden triangle-northeast Burma, northeast Thailand, and
the Kingdom of Laos. That is where
nine-tenths of the white stuff comes
from.
I do not have to talk to anybody in thL~
country-certainly no one in this Chamber-to emphasize the effects of what

drugs have done and will do to Americans. not only in Southeast Asia but in
this Nation as wE>Il. We have the rise in
crime, attributable In considerable degree to thE> rise in drug addiction. We
have our ghettos In disrepair. We have
the questiOI' of racial animosities in this
country, in Vietnam, in western Europe.
What this country is going to have to
do is to get together to combat these difficulties. We are going to have to cut
down on the spending and the waste and
the adventurism which have marked
our foreign policy since the end of the
Second World War, under both Democratic and Republican administrations,
and face up to the problems at home.
Maintaining troops or even maintaining bombers in Southeast Asia is not the
answer. Nor. incidentally, is the maintaining of 525,000 U.S. m1litary personnel and dependents in Western Europe
the answer. Nor is the maintenance of
approximately 2,000 bases, scattered
throughout the world and encompassing
every continent, the answer.
We know the kind of economic situation which confronts us today. We are
in trouble, deep trouble. That, too, along
with just about all other issues which
confront us. can be traced indirectly or
directly to Vietnam. It is a cancer on
the soul and the boay of America, and it
will not be cured until the cause is removed and we withdraw-lock. stock,
and barrel-not just from Vietnam but
from Laos, Cambodia. and Thailand as
well. That \rea is not and never has
been vital to the security of this Republic.
The distinguished Senator from Mississippi said or suggested that the Gambrell-Talmadge resolution, which is the
same as the resolution introduced today,
should be referred to the Committee on
Fore1gn Re1ations and that a report
should be issued.
Mr. President, may I say that a report
already has been issued. It has been issued by the Department of Defense and is
contained in the figures, in the statistics
in the casualties-the dead and wounded
bodies, if you will-which are enumerated on a \\eekly basis to the American
people but to which, unfortunately, too
little people pa:v attention
Here are the ftgures for Thursday last:
301,700 Americans wounded; 45,514
Americans dead in combat; 9,781 Americans noncombat dead; the dead total,
55,295. Nmw of us can take solace in
that figure, because those figures mean
AmE-ricans, men of this Nation, mostly
draitees, men who d1ed in the prime of
their hves and dtd not have a chance.
Total casualties. 356,000 as of last Thursday-356,99.• ; missing. 1,601; totally disabled, roughly 35.000 Americans.
What about the other combatants?
South Vietnam, 138,001 dead. Other free
world forces. 4,697 dead North Vietnam
and the ViE-tcong, 770,850 dead. Those
total 913.548 dead. Regardless of the
color oi a man's skin, regardless of his
cultural or social background, these men
were men-animate, human, living,
breathing beings.
Yes, we have permitted a great deal;
so many Americans have been lost; so
many Americans have been disabled; so

s 15113

much of the Nation's treasure has been
spent. The figure 356,995 American casualties is 356,995 too many. The figure
of $130 billion. roughly, spent in this
war-and it will treble into the next
century-is $130 billion too much.
The length of this war, almost 10
years-although we have been involved
there for 17 years-makes it the longest
war in the history of the Republic, and
that is too long-much too long.
Yes, I agree with the distinguished senior Senator from Vermont <Mr. AIKEN).
Insofar as our capacities will allow, we
do have a duty and an obllgatlon to
participate in the reconstruction of what
used to be one of the Associated States
of Indochina. but which is now four
separate entities. Reconstruction will
only resurrect in part what has been
destroyed in human spirit, what has been
destroyed physically through napalming,
defoliation. and ruthless destruction.
There is a moral obligation to do what
can be done to compensate. There was
no moral obligation to become engaged
in the war.
I want to say one thing in conclusion
that I have said many times; In this I
am in the great minority. It is my belief
that the assassmatlon of Ngo Dinh Diem
In 1963 was a tragedy of the greatest
magnitude, because Ngo Dinh Diem was
an honest man. incorruptible, and he
gave a measUl'e of stability to South
Vietnam. With his assassination-and
evidently this Nation played a part in
that tragedy-we found a succession of
coups by the generals taking place.
Finally, 4 years ago, we saw an election which brought into office the present
president and vice president. They were
minmity victors· Now we approach another election. 17 years after we became involved in Vietnam. What we have
is not democracy but one man on the
ticket and that one man is going to win.
I think there has been enough said
and done about Vietnamiza.tion by this
cow1try. There has been enough American blood spilt. Yes, Mr. President, there
has been enough South Vietnamese,
North Vietnamese, Vietcong, Laotian,
and Cambodian blood spilled.
The Senate, if it desires, can make a
move which I think could help to shorten
the war. It is a move which is well within
the constitutional responsibilities of this
body. IL would call for a cease ftre, it
would call for negotiations, and it would
call for the simultaneous withdrawal of
U.S. personnel from Vietnam with thl'
simultaneous release of U.S. prisoners of
war and all recoverable of the missmg
in action.
We have to face up to tins matt.er. We
cannot avoid it. So far as I am concerned, it will be brought up again and
again-and. if need be, again. and this
year.
There is no more overriding issue. I
want no more blood on my hands. I want
to see these men brought home. I want
to see. wherever possible, the MIA's recovered and the POW's released as soon
as it can. be done.
Thus, I would hope that it would be
possible within the next 1, 2, or 3 days to
reach a decision to vote on this.
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So far as the Senator from Montana
is concerned, there is not much that I
can add to what I have already said.
My time spent on this Issue will be very

brief.
What I want is a vote, and a vote in
this body soon.

September 2"1, 1971

